Customization Modes for the Harris MK-3 Authenticated Encryption Algorithm by Bajorski, Peter et al.
Rochester Institute of Technology 
RIT Scholar Works 
Presentations and other scholarship Faculty & Staff Scholarship 
9-30-2018 
Customization Modes for the Harris MK-3 Authenticated 
Encryption Algorithm 
Peter Bajorski 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
Alan Kaminsky 




Rochester Institute of Technology 
Stanislaw Radziszowski 
Rochester Institute of Technology 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.rit.edu/other 
Recommended Citation 
P. Bajorski, A. Kaminsky, M. Kurdziel, M. Łukowiak and S. Radziszowski, "Customization Modes for the 
Harris MK-3 Authenticated Encryption Algorithm," MILCOM 2018 - 2018 IEEE Military Communications 
Conference (MILCOM), Los Angeles, CA, 2018, pp. 1-5, doi: 10.1109/MILCOM.2018.8599712. 
This Conference Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty & Staff Scholarship at RIT Scholar 
Works. It has been accepted for inclusion in Presentations and other scholarship by an authorized administrator of 
RIT Scholar Works. For more information, please contact ritscholarworks@rit.edu. 
Customization Modes for the Harris MK-3
Authenticated Encryption Algorithm
Peter Bajorski∗, Alan Kaminsky†, Michael Kurdziel‡, Marcin Łukowiak§, and Stanisław Radziszowski¶
∗School of Mathematical Sciences, Rochester Institute of Technology, pxbeqa@rit.edu
†Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, ark@cs.rit.edu
‡Harris Corporation, MKurdzie@harris.com
§Department of Computer Engineering, Rochester Institute of Technology, mxleec@rit.edu
¶Department of Computer Science, Rochester Institute of Technology, spr@cs.rit.edu
Abstract—MK-3 is a new proprietary authenticated encryption
algorithm based on the duplex sponge construction. To provide
security autonomy capability, such that different users can have
sovereign variants of the encryption algorithm, MK-3 is designed
to be customizable. Two levels of customization are supported,
Factory Customization and Field Customization. Customization
is done by modifying functions and function parameters in the
algorithm to yield differing cipher functions while preserving the
algorithm’s security. This paper describes the MK-3 algorithm’s
customization options and discusses results of testing designed to
verify security autonomy among the customized variants.
I. INTRODUCTION
The MK-3 authenticated encryption algorithm [1][2] uses
the duplex sponge construction [3]. As such, the algorithm’s
design centers on a bijective function that maps a 512-bit input
state to a 512-bit output state. The bijective function consists
of several rounds: 10 rounds for a 128-bit key, 16 rounds for
a 256-bit key. Each round consists of a substitution layer with
16×16-bit S-boxes, a bit permutation layer, a mixer layer, and
a round constant addition layer.
The MK-3 algorithm is intended to be customizable. Each
customized version must yield a different encryption algorithm
that is not interoperable with any other version, while still
being as secure as the original algorithm analyzed by Kelly
[1].
This paper’s novel contributions are threefold. First, whereas
the original paper [1] described just the basic MK-3 algorithm,
this paper describes modifications to the basic algorithm’s
design to implement customized versions of the algorithm.
Second, this paper analyzes the cryptographic security of cus-
tomized versions of the algorithm. Third, this paper analyzes
whether customized versions of the algorithm are noninterop-
erable with each other and with the original version.
The MK-3 algorithm supports two levels of customization:
Factory Customization and Field Customization. The Factory
Customization capability allows different customized encryp-
tion algorithms to be provided to various customers. The user
cannot affect this level of customization. Rather, settings are
specified for a customized version, after analysis to ensure
that the customized version remains secure. These settings are
stored in firmware and are loaded into the encryption circuitry
at power-on. Factory Customization is implemented in any or
all of the bijective function layers.
Fig. 1. MK-3 duplex sponge construction
The Field Customization capability allows the user to cus-
tomize the encryption algorithm further after power-on. These
settings are stored in a 128-bit register that can be changed at
any time during operation (except in the middle of a message).
All possible register values must yield different, fully secure
customized algorithms. Field Customization is implemented in
the bijective function’s mixer layer.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the MK-3 authenticated encryption algorithm. Section III
describes the requirements for military security autonomy
among different users of a cryptographic algorithm. Section IV
describes how MK-3’s Factory Customization and Field Cus-
tomization are implemented and explains why customized ver-
sions are still secure. Section V reports results of experiments
to determine whether different customized MK-3 versions are
in fact noninteroperable. Section VI offers concluding remarks.
II. MK-3 AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION ALGORITHM
MK-3 is a new authenticated encryption algorithm that
meets government and military security requirements. It is
based on a simplified version of the duplex sponge construc-
tion [3]. Refer to Fig. 1. Padding and field separation are
applied at higher levels in the system. For this reason, it
is sufficient to specify only the MK-3 state and the MK-3
bijective function F.
The MK-3 state size is 512 bits, consisting of a 128-bit rate
portion R and a 384-bit capacity portion C. With this rate and
capacity, MK-3 can support key sizes of 128 bits and 256 bits.
These are the NIST recommended symmetric key sizes [4].
Fig. 2. MK-3 round function; each line is one 16-bit word
The MK-3 bijective function consists of a number of iterated
rounds: 10 rounds for a 128-bit key, 16 rounds for a 256-bit
key. Fig. 2 shows the round function, comprising four steps:
the Substitution Step (S), the Bitwise Permutation Step (π),
the Mix Step (M), and the Add Round Constant Step (⊕).
The 512-bit state is partitioned into thirty-two 16-bit words,
and operations are applied to these words.
The first operation in the MK-3 round function is the
Substitution Step (S). The substitution step is a bricklayer per-
mutation that uses 32 identical, bijective 16 × 16-bit S-boxes.
This step is the main source of confusion within the cipher. It
is the only nonlinear step, as is typical with most substitution-
based symmetric key algorithms [5].
The second operation is the Bitwise Permutation Step (π).
Bitwise permutations are easily implementable in hardware via
a simple rerouting of wires. Compared to a permutation on the
words of the state, a bitwise permutation intuitively provides
much better diffusion. The bitwise permutation step is the main
source of long-range diffusion (i.e., across the entire state) in
the algorithm.
The third operation is the Mix Step (M). The purpose of the
mix step is to provide local diffusion (i.e., across two words)
and to increase the linear and differential branch numbers
of a round from two to three. MK-3 uses a mixer based
on multiplication by a 2×2 matrix in GF(216) modulo the
irreducible polynomial p(x) = x16+ x5+ x3+ x2+1. The mixer
takes a vector of two input words A and B and multiplies the
vector by an invertible matrix, producing a vector of output















The final operation is the Add Round Constant Step (⊕).
A constant 512-bit value is added to the state using bitwise
exclusive-or. To disrupt symmetry and prevent slide attacks, a
different round constant is added in each round.
III. MILITARY SECURITY AUTONOMY
Sovereign cryptography refers to the capability that allows
cryptography users to install their own cryptographic algorithm
into a product after delivery and without U.S. Government or
radio vendor involvement. This provides the customer with
the capability of “Security Autonomy.” Security Autonomy
is defined as the ability to manage the security posture of
an information system in a way that is independent of any
third party. This not only includes independent operational
management of the system, but also independent design and
maintenance of the security elements of the system.
The most significant challenge to providing sovereign cryp-
tographic capability is policy related. The U.S. Department
of State export policy regulates the international distribution
of military-grade cryptographic technologies and specifically
limits sovereign cryptography approaches in military commu-
nications equipment. Development and economic feasibility,
deployment logistics, system security verification and system
reliability testing present additional challenges.
For military applications, a Security Autonomy capability
can also be provided by supplying users with their own
customized versions of a proprietary cryptographic algorithm.
The MK-3 cryptographic algorithm can be customized in
various ways. This capability is provided with two types
of customization, namely Factory Customization and Field
Customization.
Factory Customization is substantial in that the structure and
major components of the cryptographic algorithm are modi-
fied. One disadvantage of Factory Customization is that human
error can cause degradation of the cryptographic system’s
security. MK-3 employs an encryption/decryption algorithm
structure that can be customized under well understood design
constraints. Proper Factory Customization and verification al-
lows a custom algorithm variant to be provided with maximum
security.
Users might also want to restrict knowledge of their own
variant of a cryptographic algorithm. To this end, the MK-3
design allows the algorithm to be customized in the field.
Field Customization allows users to make changes to the
cryptographic algorithm via a tool after the device is provided
to them. All possible parameters that can be input into the
system via the tool to provide the Field Customization are
equally valid, and none degrade the cryptographic strength
of the algorithm. In addition, parameters for this mode of
customization are known only to the user.
IV. MK-3 CUSTOMIZATION IMPLEMENTATION
Customized versions of the MK-3 algorithm are imple-
mented by altering the round function in specific ways de-
signed to preserve the algorithm’s security while ensuring
that different customized versions of the algorithm are not
interoperable. Factory customizations affect any or all steps of
the round function. Field customizations affect the Mix Step.
A. Factory Customization
The MK-3 round function is designed to be customizable.
The user cannot change the customized features once they
are installed at the factory. The parameters and functions are
designed to preserve the algorithm’s security; consequently,
each potential group of parameters and functions must be
analyzed to ensure they meet security requirements.
1) Substitution Step Factory Customization: The MK-3
S-box computes the following function of the 16-bit input α:
S(α) = A · α−1 + b
The input is treated as an element of GF(216)/ f (x), where
f (x) is a degree-16 irreducible polynomial; the inverse α−1
is computed; the inverse is treated as a 16-bit vector and an
affine transform is applied, yielding the 16-bit output. The
affine transform is defined by a 16×16-bit invertible matrix A
and a 16-bit vector b. The MK-3 paper [1] specified an S-box
with a particular irreducible polynomial f (x), matrix A, and
vector b.
The MK-3 security analysis in [1] was based on these
characteristics of the S-box:
• No fixed points, where S(α) = α.
• No opposite fixed points, where S(α) = bitwise comple-
ment of α.
• Maximum differential probability ≤ 2−14.
• Maximum linear bias ≤ 2−8.
However, the security analysis did not assume any particular
values for the irreducible polynomial f (x), the matrix A, or the
vector b. Therefore, the Substitution Step can be customized,
without affecting the algorithm’s security, by changing any or
all of f (x), A, and b, yielding a different S-box mapping.
A tool set is used to create a customized S-box. Given a
degree-16 irreducible polynomial f (x), the tool generates a
random invertible matrix A and a random vector b; analyzes
the resulting S-box to verify that it meets the preceding
security requirements; and repeats if necessary with different
A and b until the S-box is suitable.
2) Bitwise Permutation Step Factory Customization: The
Bitwise Permutation Step in [1] rearranges the 512 bits of the
state via this formula:
π(x) = 31x + 15 (mod 512)
where x is the input bit position (0 ≤ x ≤ 511) and π(x) is
the output bit position (0 ≤ π(x) ≤ 511).
The MK-3 security analysis in [1] was based on these
characteristics of the bitwise permutation:
• Each output bit of a given S-box goes to a different
mixer’s input bit.
• The bitwise permutation has no fixed points, where
π(x) = x.
• The order of each bit position is greater than the number
of rounds in the bijective function.
As the bijective function goes through multiple rounds,
each bit position in the input state is repeatedly permuted
by applying the above formula. Repeatedly applying the
permutation formula to a bit position—that is, computing
π(π(. . . (π(x))))—eventually yields the same bit position as
the original x. The “order” of a bit position is the number of
repetitions needed for a bit to return to its original position.
A bit that returns to the same position during the rounds of
the bijective function is a weakness that an attacker might
be able to exploit. (For example, an attack on the PRESENT
block cipher was successful due in part to its round function’s
bitwise permutation, which has fixed points and small orders
[6].)
Any bitwise permutation formula that meets the preceding
security requirements may be used without degrading the
security of MK-3. Kelly [1] identified 384 suitable permutation
formulas. The factory customizes the Bitwise Permutation Step
by choosing one of these formulas.
3) Mix Step Factory Customization: As will be seen, Field
Customization of the Mix Step uses a fixed 256-element
lookup table. Each table element gives the coefficients of a dif-
ferent degree-16 irreducible polynomial. The table’s contents
are established during Factory Customization. The factory cus-
tomizes the table by choosing 256 different polynomials from
among the 4080 possible degree-16 irreducible polynomials.
4) Add Round Constant Step Factory Customization: The
Add Round Constant Step exclusive-ors a 512-bit constant into
the state. Each round uses a different round constant. Kelly [1]
specified particular round constants.
The security of MK-3 depends on these characteristics of
the round constants:
• Every round constant is different.
• There is no structure in the round constants.
However, the security analysis does not depend on the
particular values of the round constants. Therefore, the Add
Round Constant Step can be customized, without affecting the
algorithm’s security, by choosing different round constants that
meet the preceding requirements.
A recommended method for creating round constants is
to apply a cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-512
or SHA-3-512, to compute the digests of successive counter
values starting from an arbitrary value, and to use the digests
as the round constants.
B. Field Customization
MK-3 includes a 128-bit Field Customization Register
(FCR) that performs additional customization beyond the
factory installed function and parameter settings. The FCR’s
contents may be changed at any time during operation. All of
the possible FCR values yield fully secure, yet noninteropera-
ble customized versions of the MK-3 algorithm. The user can
therefore pick any FCR value without needing to analyze the
security of the resulting version.
As previously stated, each mixer in the Mix Step treats its
inputs as field elements in GF(216), that is, polynomials. The
mixer’s outputs A′ and B′ are computed from its inputs A and
B by these formulas:
A′ = A + xB
B′ = x A + xB + B
The mixer’s output computations involve field multiplications.
A GF(216) field multiplication is the polynomial product of
the field elements modulo an irreducible degree-16 polynomial
Fig. 3. MK-3-based authenticated stream cipher, 128-bit key
p(x). Kelly [1] specified the mixer’s irreducible polynomial as
p(x) = x16 + x5 + x3 + x2 + 1.
However, the security analysis does not depend on the par-
ticular choice of the mixers’ irreducible polynomial. Choosing
a different irreducible polynomial will alter the output values
computed by the above formulas, thereby altering the MK-3
round function’s mapping, without affecting its security.
The 128-bit FCR is partitioned into sixteen 8-bit sections,
one section for each of the sixteen mixers in the round func-
tion. Each mixer’s circuitry uses the value of the corresponding
FCR section as an index into the 256-element irreducible
polynomial table described previously to obtain the irreducible
polynomial coefficients for that mixer. Note that different
mixers can be made to use different irreducible polynomials.
Thus, changing the FCR setting in the field changes the
mapping calculated by each mixer, yielding a customized
version of the MK-3 algorithm. Because the FCR setting
picks each mixer’s polynomial out of a factory-specified table
of irreducible polynomials, every possible FCR setting is
guaranteed to yield a valid mixer mapping.
V. MK-3 SECURITY AUTONOMY TESTING
To evaluate whether Field Customization yields noninter-
operable versions of MK-3, we created two software imple-
mentations of an MK-3-based authenticated stream cipher,
including the FCR. Fig. 3 depicts the first implementation,
which inputs a 128-bit key and a 128-bit nonce and outputs
a 128-bit keystream (KS) and a 128-bit tag. Fig. 4 depicts
the second implementation, which inputs a 256-bit key (split
into two 128-bit chunks) and a 128-bit nonce and outputs
a 128-bit keystream and a 128-bit tag. The keystream and
tag are what would be obtained by encrypting an all-zero
plaintext block. (While we used a single keystream block in
our tests, multiple keystream blocks might be generated when
encrypting an actual message.)
We tested the original MK-3 version from [1] as well as ten
factory-customized versions. The customized versions altered
the S-box’s A matrix and b vector, the Mix Step’s table of
irreducible polynomials, and the round constants, as described
previously.
To test each factory-customized version, we applied various
key, nonce, and FCR inputs (described below), we observed
the keystream and tag outputs, and we used statistical tests
Fig. 4. MK-3-based authenticated stream cipher, 256-bit key
to determine whether the outputs showed random behavior
or nonrandom behavior. Of course, a secure cipher should
generate random outputs.
The statistical tests took the form of odds ratio uniformity
tests on a series of outputs (keystream, tag) resulting from
a series of differing inputs (key, nonce, FCR). The odds
ratio uniformity test uses the methodology of Bayesian model
selection [7]. The odds ratio uniformity test calculates the
logarithm of the posterior odds ratio of two hypotheses: H1,
that the series of output values obeys a discrete uniform
distribution, and H2, that the series of output values does
not obey a discrete uniform distribution. If the log odds
ratio is positive, then H1’s probability is greater than H2’s
probability, indicating that the output series is random. Vice
versa, if the log odds ratio is negative, then H2’s probability is
greater than H1’s probability, indicating that the output series
is nonrandom. For detailed information about the odds ratio
uniformity test, see Appendix B of [8].
We performed four kinds of statistical tests:
• Avalanche Test (AVAL). We inputed an all-zero key, an
all-zero nonce, and an all-zero FCR, and we observed
the keystream and tag outputs. Then we applied a series
of inputs, each of which differed from the original input
by flipping a single bit in the key, nonce, or FCR,
and we observed the series of differences (exclusive-ors)
between the resulting outputs and the original outputs. We
applied odds ratio uniformity tests to detect nonrandom
behavior in the series of differences. These tested whether
flipping a single input bit resulted in completely different
(random) outputs.
• Key Varying Difference Test (KVDT). We inputed an all-
zero key, an all-zero nonce, and an all-zero FCR, and we
observed the keystream and tag outputs. Then we applied
a series of values to the key input while keeping the nonce
and FCR the same. The key inputs formed a Gray code
sequence, in which successive keys differed in just one bit
position. We observed the series of differences (exclusive-
ors) between the each output and the previous output. We
applied odds ratio uniformity tests to detect nonrandom
behavior in the series of differences. These tested whether
a small change to the key resulted in completely different
(random) outputs.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF NONRANDOM ROUNDS FOR EACH TEST
AND MK-3 VERSION, 128-BIT KEY
Version AVAL KVDT NVDT FVDT
Original 2 1 2 1
Custom 1 2 1 2 3
Custom 2 2 1 2 3
Custom 3 2 1 2 1
Custom 4 2 1 2 3
Custom 5 2 1 2 1
Custom 6 2 1 2 4
Custom 7 2 1 2 3
Custom 8 2 1 2 1
Custom 9 2 1 2 1
Custom 10 2 1 2 4
• Nonce Varying Difference Test (NVDT). This was the
same as the Key Varying Difference Test, except the
nonce was varied rather than the key. These tested
whether a small change to the nonce resulted in com-
pletely different (random) outputs.
• FCR Varying Difference Test (FVDT). This was the same
as the Key Varying Difference Test, except the FCR
was varied rather than the key. These tested whether a
small change to the FCR resulted in completely different
(random) outputs.
We tested with the bijective function reduced to one round,
two rounds, and so on up to the full number of rounds.
With just one round, the outputs were nonrandom (the log
odds ratio was negative). As the number of rounds increased,
eventually the outputs became random (the log odds ratio was
positive). This analysis determines the number of rounds that
are required to ensure that the outputs’ behavior is random.
Table I gives the results of the AVAL, KVDT, NVDT, and
FVDT tests on the original version and the ten customized
versions of the MK-3-based stream cipher with a 128-bit key.
The table reports the number of nonrandom rounds detected.
For example, the AVAL test result says that when the bijective
function is reduced to one or two rounds, the test reported
nonrandom behavior in the keystream and tag outputs; that is,
the values in a series of outputs were not uniformly distributed.
With the bijective function reduced to three or more rounds,
the test reported random behavior in the outputs. As the full
number of rounds is 10 for a 128-bit key and eight rounds
exhibited random output behavior, the “randomness margin”
for this test is 8/10 or 0.80. The worst-case randomness margin
over all the tests is 0.60.
Similarly, Table II gives the results of the AVAL, KVDT,
NVDT, and FVDT tests on the original version and the ten
customized versions of the MK-3-based stream cipher with a
256-bit key. The full number of rounds is 16 for a 256-bit key;
thus, the worst-case randomness margin is 14/16 or 0.88.
Returning to the original question, whether Field Cus-
tomization yields noninteroperable MK-3 versions: The AVAL
and FVDT results show that when the FCR value is changed,
the output before the change and the output after the change
bear no relationship to each other; more precisely, the differ-
TABLE II
NUMBER OF NONRANDOM ROUNDS FOR EACH TEST
AND MK-3 VERSION, 256-BIT KEY
Version AVAL KVDT NVDT FVDT
Original 1 1 2 2
Custom 1 1 1 2 2
Custom 2 1 1 2 2
Custom 3 1 1 2 1
Custom 4 1 1 2 2
Custom 5 1 1 2 1
Custom 6 1 1 2 2
Custom 7 1 1 2 2
Custom 8 1 1 2 1
Custom 9 1 1 2 1
Custom 10 1 1 2 2
ence is a uniformly distributed random variable. Therefore,
the ciphertexts and tags produced by one field-customized
MK-3 version cannot be successfully decrypted by another
field-customized MK-3 version; in other words, the versions
are noninteroperable. This holds true both for 128-bit keys and
256-bit keys, provided the bijective function computes the full
number of rounds (10 or 16, respectively).
The statistical tests also show that the MK-3 stream cipher
generates unrelated keystreams and tags when the key or the
nonce is changed. A secure cipher requires this behavior.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have described how changing various parameters in the
MK-3 encryption algorithm yields different noninteroperable,
yet fully secure, customized versions. Factory Customization
provides a sovereign cryptography capability to each MK-3
customer; the factory ensures that the customized version is
as secure as the original version. Field Customization allows
each individual user to customize the algorithm further without
needing to do a security analysis. Statistical tests showed that
Field Customization does yield noninteroperable versions.
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